
Amendment 87 (passed narrowly in November 2026) replaces Colorado’s longstanding flat 4.4% income tax with a graduated system effective for tax year 2027.
It creates six brackets roughly as follows (minor variations appear across official summaries): 3.7% on the first $25,000; 4.2% to $100,000; 4.4% to $500,000; then jumps to 7.4% ($500k–$750k), 7.9% ($750k–$1M), and 8.4% above $1M. The same structure applies to individuals, pass-throughs, estates/trusts, and C corporations. It is projected to raise roughly $2 billion annually (up to ~$2.7 billion in some estimates) dedicated to K-12 education, healthcare, and early childhood programs, exempt from TABOR limits. Most filers below roughly $500k–$510k see modest cuts (capped around $325); those above see increases that scale sharply.
This is a major structural shift: it ends the constitutional flat-rate requirement under TABOR that had been in place since the late 1980s/early 1990s and aligns Colorado more with progressive federal and multi-state systems—but at a top marginal rate that is now regionally high.
Why this structure can hurt Colorado long-term
High-income individuals and mobile businesses respond to marginal rate differences. Colorado’s new top rate of 8.4% nearly doubles the prior flat rate on income above $1 million and is substantially higher than neighboring or competitor states (Wyoming has no income tax; several nearby states top out under 6%). Pass-through businesses (common among small and mid-sized firms) and highly compensated employees face the increase directly on their returns. Static revenue estimates assume the tax base stays put; dynamic effects relocation, reduced investment, or income shifting can erode it.
Palantir’s headquarters relocation provides a concrete illustration of capital mobility.
In February 2026 (before the election), Palantir—Colorado’s largest publicly traded company by market value at the time—moved its principal executive office from Denver to the Miami/Aventura, Florida area. The company had relocated from Palo Alto to Denver in 2020 citing cultural differences with Silicon Valley. Official statements were brief; contemporaneous reporting noted protests over its government contracts, Colorado AI legislation compliance costs, climate/wildfire risks in filings, and Florida’s business climate (including no personal income tax and stronger noncompete tools). Florida has attracted tech and high-net-worth migration precisely because of its tax environment. Even if the move was multi-factorial, it demonstrates that a major employer can and will leave for a zero-income-tax state. Governor Polis and Denver officials learned of it via public announcement rather than advance notice.
Senate Minority Leader Lisa Frizzell states she is already hearing from people planning to move companies out of Colorado because Amendment 87 “doubles the tax on anyone over $500K, small businesses included.” Replies and related discussion echo concerns about wealthy families adjusting residency (e.g., spending enough time in Florida or Wyoming) and businesses of sufficient size finding it irrational to stay if not tied to immobile assets.
Projected longer-term mechanisms of harm
- Outmigration of the tax base: High earners and profitable pass-throughs are mobile. Pre-election reporting already noted some clients of tax attorneys changing residency documents toward Florida. Business groups and analysts (including Common Sense Institute projections) forecast net losses of firms in higher brackets and associated high-income residents/jobs over 10–20 years. When those filers leave, Colorado loses both the new higher-rate revenue and the prior 4.4% baseline, plus secondary economic activity (spending, employment, real-estate demand).
- Competitiveness and investment drag: A top rate of 8.4% signals higher costs relative to no-tax or lower-tax destinations. Chambers and developers have warned of reduced office/housing demand, harder recruiting of talent, and decisions by expanding firms to locate elsewhere. Real-estate and chamber leaders reported early conversations about exits or skipped investments after passage.
- Revenue instability and feedback loops: Static models project ~$2B. If high-income filers or firms leave or restructure, collections fall short of expectations while new spending commitments (education, health, childcare) remain. Bracket creep is built in—the thresholds are not inflation-adjusted—so more income gradually hits the higher rates. This can create pressure for further rate increases or spending cuts later.
- Broader growth effects: Higher marginal rates on successful businesses and talent reduce the after-tax return to expansion, hiring, and entrepreneurship in Colorado. Neighboring zero- or low-tax states become relatively more attractive for the same mobile capital and people that Colorado previously drew.
Proponents emphasize that ~97% of taxpayers see cuts, most small businesses fall below the higher brackets, corporate increases largely fall on non-Colorado owners, and historical “millionaire flight” studies often show limited aggregate effects. Those points address short-term incidence and average outcomes. They do not eliminate the incentive for the highest earners and most mobile firms—the very taxpayers who generate disproportionate revenue and economic activity—to optimize location. Palantir’s actual departure and Frizzell’s report of active relocation conversations are early data points consistent with that incentive. Over a multi-year horizon, the combination of a regionally high top rate, no inflation indexing, and demonstrated willingness of capital to move to Florida-style environments raises a material risk of a thinner high-end tax base, slower job/investment growth, and tighter long-run fiscal constraints than the static $2B figure implies.